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THE INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
FRAMEWORK FOR CYBERSECURITY
By: Paul Rosenzweig*
Cyberspace is a domain without distinct borders where action at a
distance is a new reality. In effect, almost every computer in America
is a potential border entry point. This reality makes international
engagement on cybersecurity essential.
Even more notably, the sheer scale of the network demands a
global approach. The Internet is as large a human enterprise as has
ever been created. More than 2 billion users' send more than 88
quadrillion emails annually, and they register a new domain name
with the Internet Corporation for Assigning Names and Numbers
("ICANN") every second of every day. 2 The scope of the Internet is as
broad as the globe and that makes the scope of the Internet
governance question equally as broad - who sets the rules for the
Internet and what rules they set is a fundamental question that can
only be answered on an international basis.
This then, is a fundamental question-perhaps the fundamental
question-of cyber conflict today: How does a fractured international
community respond to the phenomenon of the Internet?
One has the clear sense that, forty years ago, when the Internet
was born,' the various sovereign nations of the world did not think
much about the innovation. By and large, they systematically ignored
it and let it grow on its own with a relatively unstructured set of
governing authorities. And then sometime in the last ten years, the
nations of the world looked up and suddenly recognized that the
Internet had become this immense entity and that it had a vast
influence and power. The Internet could be used to change
governments and spread culture; it could run nuclear power plants
* Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University; Principal,
Red Branch Consulting, PLLC; Visiting Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation. This work will appear as a chapter in the forthcoming
book Cyber Warfare: How Conflict in Cyberspace is Challenging Amer-
ica and Changing the World (Praeger 2012). @ Paul Rosenzweig, all
rights reserved.
1. E.g., Jonathan Lynn, Internet Users to Exceed 2 Billion This Year,
REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2010, 9:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2010/10/19/us-telecoms-internet-idUSTRE69I24720101019.
2. Barry Riholtz, 60 Seconds: Things that Happen Every 60 Seconds, THE
BIG PICTURE (Dec. 26, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/
2011/12/60-seconds-things-that-happen-every-sixty-seconds/.
3. Phillip Rosenbaum, Web Pioneer Recalls 'Birth of the Internet', CNN
TECH (Oct. 29, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-10-29/tech/kleinr
ock.internet 1 internet-leonard-kleinrock-computer?_s=PM:TECH.
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and fight a war. With that realization, sovereign nations became
quickly and intensely interested in the Internet. The result is a trend
toward the "re-sovereignization" 4 of cyberspace or what Chris
Demchack and Peter Dombrowski of the Naval War College call the
"Rise of a Cybered Westphalian Age"' - that is, an age in which
sovereign nations control the Internet.'
And so, the questions are: Who will run the Internet? Will it be
separate sovereign countries? Will it be the UN? Or a set of non-
governmental organizations like ICANN and the Internet Engineering
Task Force ("IETF")? Or, perhaps a series of bi-national or
multilateral groups? For America this question poses a problem.
Some think it is critical that our engagement occur in a manner that
is protective of American interests and maintains American freedom
of action.' By contrast, some (including the Obama Administration)
advocate a general approach that favors the development of
multilateral norms to preserve the openness of the Internet,' while
relying on supra-national organizations to manage cybersecurity
4. National Security Experts Discuss Need for Cybersecurity Cooperation,
ABA Now AROUND THE BAR (Aug. 5, 2012), http://www.abanow.org/
2012/08/national-security-experts-discuss-need-for-cybersecurity-coope-
ration/ (discussing Rosenzweig's comments about the U.N.'s proposed
changes in the governing of the internet). Compare Scott Cleland,
Twitter's RealPolitik & the Sovereign-ization of the Internet, FORBES
(Jan. 27, 2012, 6:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottcleland/20
12/01/27/twitters-realpolitik-the-sovereign-ization-of-the-internet/
(discussing Twitter's ability to censor content from users in specific
countries allowing countries to maintain sovereignty within their
geographic borders in cyberspace), with Omar El Akkad, Google
Threatens to Pull Out of China, GLOBE & MAIL, http://www.
theglobeandmail.com/technology/google-threatens-to-pull-out-of-china/
article 1207172/ (last updated Aug. 23, 2012) (discussing Google's plans
to stop censoring search results within China's geographic borders).
5. Chris Demchack & Peter Dombrowski, Rise of a Cybered Westphalian
Age, 5 STRATEGIC STUDIES Q. 32 (2011).
6. In 1648, the Peace of Westphalia ended the 30 Year War and
established the modern system of national sovereignty. The Westphalian
system is premised on the territoriality of states, and the principle of
non-interference by one state in the internal affairs of another. That
system has, more or less, controlled international affairs for over 450
years. See Peace of Westphalia Treaty, May 15-Oct. 24, 1648, 30 I.L.M.
2.
7. See Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View, HOOVER
INST., Feb. 2011, at 12 (arguing that no treaty which is beneficial to the
United States will be adopted by other countries).
8. See THE WHITEHOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASsURING A
TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRAST-
RUCTURE 20 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/
documents/Cyberspace PolicyReview final.pdf ("International norms
are critical to establishing a secure and thriving digital infrastructure.").
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problems.9 The choice is of truly profound significance-perhaps more
so than any other policy question to be addressed in the cyber
domain.
This brief article begins by describing the existing Internet
governance and describing the dynamic that is leading to change.
After assessing some of the barriers to effective international Internet
governance, it closes with a brief discussion of United States-Canada
cybersecurity cooperation.
I. EXISTING INTERNET GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES AND
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL NORMS
In this first section, I want to briefly describe the existing Internet
governance structures using the security of the domain name system
as a prism through which to examine their operation. I then want to
examine how nation states are responding to that governance
structure and close with concerns expressed by human rights activists.
A. ICANN and the IETF
Domain names are familiar to everyone who uses the Internet. In
any web address (for example, http://www.redbranchconsulting.com)
it is the portion of the address after http://www. Domain names are
familiar ways to identify the web page you are seeking to access or
the email address you are trying to reach. We know them and
recognize them readily Microsoft.com takes you to Bill Gates'
company 0 and direct.gov.uk takes you to the front page of Her
Majesty's Government in London."
Of course, computers do not use names like "Microsoft" or "Her
Majesty's Government" to route traffic. They use numbers. The
Domain Name System ("DNS") is, in effect, a translation system-it
takes a domain name and translates it to an Internet Protocol address
("IP address"). 2 The IP address is a binary number inside the
computer (that is, just a string of Is and Os), but it is usually written
in a traditional format when put down for humans to read (for
example 172.16.254.1)." The IP address tells the Internet routing
9. See id. at 21-22 (discussing multinational organizations that address
cybersecurity policies and activities).
10. MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
11. Gov'T OF THE U.K., http://direct.gov.uk (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
12. See Bradley Mitchell, DNS-Domain Name System, ABOUT.coM GUIDE,
http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/domainnamesystem/g/bldef dns.
htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) ("DNS automatically converts the names
we type in our Web browser address bar to the IP addresses of Web
servers hosting those sites.").
13. See, e.g., Bradley Mitchell, IP Address, ABOUT.COM GUIDE, http://
compnetworking.about.com/od/workingwithipaddresses/g/ip-
407
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system where a particular server is on the Internet, and then the
Internet Protocol tells the system how to get the message from "here"
to "there," wherever "there" may be.14
So the DNS link works in a three-stage process. An individual
(Paul Rosenzweig) registers a domain name
(redbranchconsulting.com) which is hosted on a server somewhere and
that server is identified by an IP address. When a potential client
wants to access the Red Branch web site by typing in that domain
name, the DNS programming helps to route the request to the right
server and return the web page.
The addressing function of the DNS is absolutely critical. If the
DNS system were corrupted, hijacked or broken, then communications
across the Internet would break down. And it also means that keeping
a good registry of which domain names are in use is just as vital. If
"Microsoft.com" is taken by Microsoft, the computer software giant,
it cannot be used by Microsoft a (hypothetical) manufacturer of small
soft washcloths. Somebody needs to be in charge of keeping the books
and making sure they are all straight.
That somebody is the Internet Corporation for Assigning Names
and Numbers ("ICANN").'6 ICANN is a non-profit organization that
sets the rules for creating and distributing domain names."6 When the
Internet was first turned on, the function for assigning names was
actually done by a single man, John Postel," who helped create the
first Internet as a project for the Advanced Research Projects
Administration ("ARPA")."' Since ARPA was a Federal government
addresses.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (An IP address is a binary
number that uniquely identifies computers..."). See also Bradley
Mitchell, Introduction to the Domain Name System (DNS), ABuOUT.COM
GUIDE, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/dns domainnamesystern
/a/ introduction-to-drisdomain-name-system.htrn (last visited Oct.7,
2012) (discussing how binary code is translated into a traditional
format).
14. See Mitchell, supra note 12.
15. See generally Welcome, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/welco-
me (last visited Oct. 7, 2012) (explaining that "coordinates the Domain
Name System (DNS), Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, space allocation,
protocol identifier assignment, generic (gTLD) and country code
(ccTLD) Top-Level Domain name system management, and root server
system management functions.").
16. Definition of ICANN, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/learn-
ing/glossary/i?language=%2A%2A%2ACURRENTLANGUAGE%2A
%2A%2A (last visited Oct. 7, 2012).
17. See PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F. Supp. 2d. 389, 391
(D.N.Y. 1999).
18. See id.
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funded agency this, in effect, meant that the U.S. government
handled the naming function.19
In the long run, of course, as the Internet grew to span the globe,
a U.S.-run and -managed naming convention was considered too
insular and unilateral.2 0 ICANN was chartered in 1998 as a means of
transitioning control over Internet naming from the U.S. government
to a non-profit private sector organization." Today, ICANN operates
from California but has a global constituency, registering new domain
names every day.22
In theory, the DNS system should be completely transparent -
knowing a domain name (the "cyber-persona" of a person or
company) you should be able find out who the real person behind the
domain name is. Unfortunately, the system does not work as
effectively as it should. In December 2011, ICANN completed a
comprehensive review of the WHOIS functions. 23 The conclusion of
the report is both chilling and accurate. The report "concisely
present [s] in a balanced and fair manner the very real truth that the
current [WHOIS] system is broken and needs to be repaired."24
Because domain registry companies (like GoDaddy25 ) accept
identification that appears to be lawful and because they make no real
attempt to verify the information they receive, the WHOIS registry is
littered with errors, both accidental and deliberate. 26
Just as ICANN is the international organization that runs the
program for assigning domain names, another non-governmental
19. See generally id. (explaining that Postel's project was through a contra-
ct between DARPA, ARPA, and UCLA).
20. See Tony Bradley, The Upside of Unbinding ICANN from U.S. Oversi-
ght, PCWORLD (Oct. 1, 2009), https://www.pcworld.com/businesscent-
er/article/172954/the upside of unbinding-icann from us oversight
.html.
21. See ICANN, supra note 15.
22. See Esther Dyson, Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN): The Short Version, 11 WORLD TRADE & ARB.
MATERIALS 32, 39-40 (1999) (explaining that four different constituency
groups represent communities around the globe and that ICANN
operates out of Los Angeles, California).
23. See generally WHOIS POLICY REVIEW TEAM, FINAL REPORT TO ICANN
(2012) (stating that all of the meetings of the review team occurred
during 2011).
24. Id. at 6.
25. See id. at 29 (stating that GoDaddy is one of the largest domain
registry companies).
26. See id. at 32 (stating that registrar companies are "required to verify
information at the time of registration but in practicality it does not
happen"); see also id. at 73 (explaining that accidental errors often
occur because buyers do not realize how important the information is).
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organization, the Internet Engineering Task Force ("IETF"), is
responsible (in an indirect way) for developing the technical aspects of
the computer code and protocols that drive the Internet.27 Nobody
actually owns or operates the Internet itself. While private sector and
government actors own pieces of the cyber domain (various routers
and nodes, for example) the actual rules for how the cyber domain
works are set by the IETF which is an "open international community
of network designers, operators, vendors and researchers concerned
with the evolution of the Internet architectures and the smooth
operation of the Internet."" This community operates by the
promulgation of technical standards, which, in the end, become de
facto operating requirements for any activity in cyberspace.29 Thus,
some questions about cybersecurity necessarily require engagement
with an engineering community that is both internationalist and
consensus-oriented, characteristics that may be inconsistent with
effective U.S. government action.
Put another way, the IETF's self-described mission is to "make
the Internet work better""o but it quickly notes that it is an
"engineering" group so what it means by "better" is "more technically
effective," not better in some metaphysical sense."
The IETF is a self-organized group of engineers who consider
technical specifications for the Internet.32 Anyone may join and the
group's proposals (or decision not to make a proposal) are the product
of a rough consensus.3 The IETF has no enforcement function at all -
27. See generally Overview of the IETF, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK
FORCE, http://www.ietf.org/old/2009/overview.html (last visited Oct.
20, 2012) (explaining the organizational hierarchy of the IETF).
28. Id.
29. INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, http://www.ietf.org (last visited
Oct. 20, 2012).
30. Paul Rosenzweig, The Organization of the United States Government
and Private Sector for Achieving Cyber Deterrence, in PROCEEDINGS OF
A WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES
AND DEVELOPING OPTIONS FOR. U.S. POLICY, 245, 255 n.44 (2010).
31. See Getting Started in the IETF, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE,
http://www.ietf.org/newcomers.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2012) ("make
the Internet work better from an engineering point of view").
32. See Paul Hoffman, ed., The Tao of IEFT: A Novice's Guide to the
Internet Engineering Task Force,_INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE,
https://www.ietf.org/tao.html (last modified Nov. 2, 2011) ("The IETF
is a loosely self-organized group of people who contribute to the
engineering and evolution of Internet technologies. It is the principal
body engaged in the development of new Internet standard
specifications.").
33. See id. (explaining that in order to join, a person subscribes to the
mailing list as well as defining "rough consensus" as "a very large
majority of those who care agree").
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anyone is free to disregard the technical standards it sets, but they do
so at their own peril." Because of the openness, inclusiveness, and
non-partisan nature of its endeavors, IETF standards have become
the "gold standard" for Internet engineering." In addition to the
standard setting function, IETF also identifies lesser standards,
known as "best current practices," that are more in the nature of
good advice than of operative requirements. 6 Given the near-
universality of IETF standards and practices, anyone who chooses not
to follow the standards set forth risks ineffective connections to the
broader network. And so, even without a single means of forcing
people to follow its dictates, the IETF in effect sets the rules of the
road for the Internet technical functions.37
By way of example, one of the recent technical specifications
adopted by the IETF is something known as "DNSSEC," which
stands for Domain Name System Security Extension.38  Under the
general rubric of DNSSEC, the IETF has proposed a suite of security
add-on functionalities that would become part of the accepted
Internet Protocol." The new security features would allow a user to
confirm the origin authentication of DNS data, authenticate the
denial or existence of a domain name, and assure the data integrity of
the DNS.40 In other words, the DNSSEC protocols would allow users
to be sure that when they attempt to connect to a domain name (say
"whitehouse.gov") they are reaching the "true" whitehouse.gov web
site and not some phony facsimile of that web site.
34. Id. ("The IETF makes voluntary standards that are often adopted by
Internet users, but it does not control, or even patrol, the Internet.").
35. Id. ("The IETF is not a traditional standards organization, although
many specifications that are produced become standards.").
36. See id. (explaining that "best current practices" (BCPs) make recomrn-
endations for the current applications on the internet).
37. See generally INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, supra note 29
(explaining that the function of the IETF is to make the Internet run
smoothly by recommending a series of technical functions for those who
wish to follow them).
38. See generally R. Arends, et al., DNS Security Introduction and
Requirements, INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE (Mar. 2005), http:
//www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4033.txt (explaining extensions to the Domain
Name System to protect data integrity).
39. See id. at 6 (explaining the proposed security add-ons and what their
purposes are); see also DNSSEC - What Is It and Why Is It Important?,
ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/learning/factsheets/dnssec-
qaa-09oct08-en.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2012) (explaining what the
DNSSEC does and what its implementation into Internet Protocol
would mean for users.)
40. See generally Arends, supra note 38 (explaining the process that the
security add-on functionalities go through in order to secure data with
in DNS).
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Without that sort of security system, efforts to navigate the web
are susceptible to "man-in-the-middle" attacks - an attack where the
malicious actor steps into the middle of a conversation and hijacks it
by making independent connections with the victims. From the
middle vantage point, he can relay messages between the victims
making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over
a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation is controlled
by the malicious actor.'
To see the interplay between IETF and ICAAN, consider the
question of how DNSSEC will be implemented. Critical to DNSSEC's
effective functioning is the need to establish a "chain of trust" for
domain name authentication.4 2 After all, how do you know that the
"chase.com" web page is authentic? Because a certificating authority
(probably a company, like VeriSign, 3 that is in the business of
authentication) has distributed to Chase an authentication key. And
how do you know that VeriSign is itself, authentic? At some point up
the chain there has to be an "original" root authentication that serves
as a "trust anchor" to the chain of trust. Currently, the trust anchor
is provided by ICANN; though, some people do not trust ICANN
because it is an American company and is thought to still be
subservient to American interests.
And so, the international r6gime of NGO Internet governance
works, pretty effectively, but there are some who doubt its true
neutrality.44 This has led sovereign nations to think of ways to
reassert their authority.
B. The Rise of Sovereigns
Nobody owns the Internet. As we have said, currently technical
standards are set by the IETF and limited substantive regulation of
the Internet (e.g. the creation of new top level domain names and the
41. Paul Rosenzweig, Online Piracy and Internet Security: Congress Asks
the Right Question but Offers the Wrong Answers, HERITAGE FOUND.
(Jan.17, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/01/onli-
ne-piracy-sopa-and-internet-security-pipa-bills-in-congress.
42. See generally Goldsmith, supra note 6 (explaining the process of what
happens in DNSSEC verification of domain names).
43. See generally VERISIGN, http://www.verisigninc.com/?loc=en US (last
visited Nov. 1, 2012) (detailing the services offered by VeriSign).
44. See generally ICANN, CHEMISTRY DAILY, http://www.chemistrydaily
.com/chemistry/ ICANN (last visited Nov. 1, 2012); see also Sam,
ICANN, THE WEB WORD, http://classes.dma.ucla.edu/Winter06/161B/
projects/lenny/final/articles/show/10 (last visited Jan. 1, 2013) (discus-
sing personal views of respective writers).
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like) is done by ICANN.4 5 This quasi-independent non-profit
international governance is the current norm. 6
On a nation-state level, this is slowly changing. Some countries
have responded to this reality by attempting to cut themselves off
from the Internet or censor traffic arriving at their cyber borders. The
most notorious example is China's attempt to construct a "Great
Firewall" to keep Internet traffic out of the country."T China conducts
an active effort to suppress adverse news on the Internet, with more
than 300,000 Internet monitors engaged in the process.48 As a result
the recent unrest in the Middle East seems to be unable to find
traction in China. The instinct to regulate is not, however, limited to
authoritarian r6gimes; even liberal Western countries like Australia
have proposed restrictions on Internet traffic, albeit for facially more
legitimate reasons, such as limiting the spread of child pornography.49
Or, consider another example from a relatively small nation,
Belarus. According to the Library of Congress on December 21, 2011
the Republic of Belarus published Law No. 317-3.50 The law imposes
restrictions on visiting and/or using foreign websites by Belarusian
citizens and residents.' It also requires that all companies and
individuals who are registered as entrepreneurs in Belarus use only
domestic Internet domains for providing online services, conducting
sales, or exchanging email messages.52 In addition, the owners and
45. See generally Hoffman, supra note 32 (describing the purpose of IETF in
technical standards of the internet); see also ICANN, supra note 14
(describing regulation by ICANN of the internet).
46. See ICANN, supra note 14 (describing ICANN as a non-profit
organization which operates outside of the United States Government);
see also Hoffman, supra note 32 (describing IETF as a non-profit
independent organization devoted to making the internet work better).
47. See THE GREAT FIREWALL OF CHINA, http://www.greatfirewallofchina
.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) ("test any website and see real-time if
it's censored in China").
48. See L. Gordon Crovits, Opinion: Dictators and Internet Double Standa-
rds, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001
4240527487035800004576180662638333004.html (describing the measures
China takes to suppress news that may affect their government in a
negative way).
49. See Australia Says Web Blacklist Combats Child Porn, ASSOCIATED
PREss (Mar. 27, 2009), http://phys.org/newsl57371619.html (discussing
Australian proposed internet blacklist which has been created to combat
child pornography).
50. See Peter Roudik, Belarus:Browsing Foreign Websites a Misdemeanor,
LIBR. OF CONG. (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/
Iloc news?disp3_1205402929 text.
51. See id. (discussing the law's purposes).
52. Id.
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administrators of Internet caf6s or other places that offer access to the
Internet might be found guilty of violating this Law and fined and
their businesses might be closed if users of Internet services provided
by these places are found visiting websites located outside of Belarus
and if such behavior of the clients was not properly identified,
recorded, and reported to the authorities." Talk about a Westphalian
response to the borderless Internet!
The impetus for greater control also led a number of nations to
call for a U.N. organization (the International Telecommunications
Union ("ITU"), about which more will be discussed later) to exert
greater control over the operation of the Internet.' Likewise, some
nations have urged greater international control over the content of
the Internet.5 Indeed, Russia and China have begun advocating for
the adoption of an international treaty to govern conflict in
cyberspace - a Cyberspace Geneva Convention, if you will.51 Critical
to their draft proposals are the adoption of cyber conflict norms about
targeting), married to an international standard that allows each
nation to manage its domestic Internet however it pleases (in effect,
giving international law approval to domestic Internet censorship).5
Indeed, according to Demchack and Dombrowski, this
development is inevitable:
A new "cybered Westphalian age" is slowly emerging as state
leaders organize to protect their citizens and economies individually
and unwittingly initiate the path to borders in cyberspace. Not only
are the major powers of China and the United States already
53. Id.
54. See Leo Kelion, US Resists Control of Internet Passing to UN Agency,
BBC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-
19106420 (discussing the opposition of the U.S. government to proposals
which would allow the ITU to take greater control over the operation of
the internet); see also Brendan Sasso, House to Examine Plan for
United Nations to Regulate the Internet, THE HILL: HILLICON VALLEY
(May 26, 2012), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/
229653-house-to-examine-plan-to-let-un-regulate-internet (explaining the
proposal before the U.S. House of Representatives regarding turning
control of the internet over to the UN's ITU).
55. See Sasso, supra note 54 (explaining that U.S. hesitates to turn control
over to countries which "ban certain terms from search" because it
would in turn take away from the freedom that the internet provides).
56. See Russia Calls for Internet Revolution, RUSSIA TODAY (May 28, 2012,
4:42 PM), http://rt.com/news/itu-internet-revolution-russia-386/ (expl-
aining both the plan Russia proposed for greater international control as
well as China and India's support for the proposal).
57. See G.A. Res. 66/359, 66th Sess., c & e, U.N. Doc. A/66/359 (Sept.
14, 2011) (stopping the proliferation of information which incites
terrorism and other acts against a country and reaffirming a State's
rights and responsibilities to protect themselves against such acts).
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demonstrating key elements of emerging cybered territorial
sovereignty, other nations are quickly beginning to show similar
trends. From India to Sweden, nations are demanding control over
what happens electronically in their territory, even if it is to or from
the computers of their citizens.
This process may be meandering, but . . . it was inevitable, given
the international system of states and consistent with the history of
state formation and consolidation. As cyberspace is profoundly man-
made, no impossible barriers hinder the growth of national borders in
cyberspace. They are possible technologically, comfortable
psychologically, and manage-able systemically and politically."
That prospect certainly reflects the reality of the issue from the
perspective of nations, but it may not reflect the intent of the broader
Internet community. We can be sure of resistance to this trend.
C. Internet Access as a Human Right
One way to think of that resistance is to ask: do human beings
have a fundamental right to have access to the Internet? How you
view the question may very well drive your assessment of the right
structures for the international governance of the Internet. If you
think access is a fundamental right, you will be unalterably opposed
to the new cybered Westphalia.
Vinton G. Cerf thinks the answer is clearly "no," and he ought to
know. 5 After all, Cerf is one of the "fathers of the Internet"6 o and
currently serves as the "Chief Internet Evangelist" for Google-he is
one of the grand old men of the network." According to Cerf, the
right way to think about technology is as an "enabler" of rights - not
as the right itself.62 Human rights "must be among the things we as
humans need in order to lead healthy, meaningful lives, like freedom
from torture or freedom of conscience. It is a mistake to place any
particular technology in this exalted category, since over time we will
end up valuing the wrong things."6 3 After all, 150 years ago having a
horse might have been an essential enabler; 50 years ago a car. The
Internet, like any technology, is a means to an end, not the end itself.
58. DEMCHACK & DOMBROWSKI, supra note 5, at 35.
59. Vinton G. Cerf, Internet Access is Not a Human Right, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 5, 2012, at A25.
60. If any endeavor that is barely forty years old can be said to have a
''grand old man."
61. Vincent G. Cerf: Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist, ICANN:
BOARD, http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/cerf.htm (last visited
Jan. 1, 2013).
62. Cerf, supra note 59.
63. Id.
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Others disagree. For example, the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression," is of the view that a complete denial of
access to the Internet is a violation of international law: "[C]utting off
users from Internet access, regardless of the justification provided, [is]
disproportionate and thus a violation of article 19, paragraph 3, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."65 The
Rapporteur views the denial of Internet access as an unacceptable
means of controlling freedom of expression and limiting dissent." Set
against the backdrop of the Arab Spring,67 there is a certain force to
his concerns.
In the end, the disagreement may not matter. Most would admit
that the Internet is an exceedingly powerful enabler of freedom. Those
who design the Internet, and those who manage it, ought to do so
cognizant of the great force they have unleashed - and that it can be
used for good or ill. One way to think about the "Internet as human
right" issue is to simply ask whether those designing the Internet's
architecture (like the IETF) might not owe a duty of care to the
general world population to take greater steps to make the Internet
impervious to rnalware and viruses.
II. CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE
In this section, I want to consider some successes (rare) and
failures (sadly more frequent) that arise from our current
international structures and look at some of the satisfying and less
satisfying suggestions for improving the situation.
A. Cybercrime and The Russian Business Network
The Russian Business Network ("RBN") is truly a child of the
Internet - it could not really exist without it."
64. See generally Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) (by Frank LaRue).
65. Id. 1 78.
66. Id. 33.
67. See Crovits, supra note 48.
68. I learned a great deal about the Russian Business Network from and
was pointed to some of the sources referenced in this section by a
presentation given by Mr. Rob Wile, a graduate student in my Summer
2011 class at Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University. See
also Peter Warren, Hunt for Russia's Web Criminals, THE GUARDIAN
(Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007 /nov/15/
news.crime (discussing the creation of the Russian Business Network by
graduate students much like Google).
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The RBN was an Internet service provider, run by criminals for
criminals. 9 Its founding date is unclear but it may go back as far as
2004. The RBN was allegedly created by "Flyman," a 20-something
programmer who is said to be the nephew of a well-connected Russian
politician." Though its initial activity appears to have been legal it
quickly morphed into something more. It provided domain names,
dedicated servers, and software for criminals - a one stop shopping
center for those who want to be active on the Internet.7 2 The RBN is
sometimes called a "bullet proof network" because, in effect, users are
capable of hiding their criminal activity and are "bullet proof" against
prosecution or discovery in their country of origin."
To a large degree, the RBN was just another business: it offers
access to "bulletproof" servers for $600/month as well as highly
effective malware (price $380 per 1,000 targets),74 and rents out
botnets at the bargain basement price of $200 per bot.7 ' All this
comes with free technical support, patches, updates and fixes. 6 In its
heyday, the RBN was responsible for some of the largest criminal
hacks to date - one example would be the infamous "Rockfish"
incident, in which users were tricked into entering personal banking
69. See generally Brian Krebbs, Shadowy Russian Firm Seen as Conduit for
Cybercrime, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/12/AR2007101202461.html (expl-
aining that RBN has strong links with Russian criminal underground as
well as the government of Russia).
70. See Brian Krebs, Mapping the Russian Business Network, SECURITY Fix:
BRIAN KREBS ON INTERNET SECURITY (Oct. 13, 2007, 12:02 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2007/10/mapping-the-ru
ssian _business n.html (analyzing the origins of RBN and many of the
cybercrime attacks that they orchestrated).
71. See Warren, supra note 68 (describing the background of "Flyman" who
supposedly turned RBN toward criminal activity).
72. See Krebbs, supra note 69 (describing the various crimes that RBN has
protected including identity theft and child pornography).
73. See Krebbs, supra note 69 (describing bullet proof hosting as a web
service that will remain reachable despite efforts by law enforcement to
shut the site down).
74. Malware is short for "malicious software," in other words a software
program that has a malevolent effect. See Krebbs, supra note 69 at 2
("...a cyber-criminal who clears these hurdles can rent a dedicated Web
site from the Russian Business Network for about $600 a month, or
roughly 10 times the monthly fee for a regular dedicated Web site at
most legitimate Internet companies").
75. Botnets are networks of controlled computers- short for a "robot
network" because the innocent computers are controlled, like robots, by
someone else. Sometimes, we also call the innocent computers "zombies"
for much the same reason. See Warren, supra note 68.
76. See Warren, supra note 68.
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information on the web resulting in losses in excess of $150 million."
In another incident, a keystroke logger program (one that records
keystrokes input on a keyboard - like a password entry) was placed
on the computers of most of the customers of the Bank of India." The
RBN is also said to have provided some support for Russia during the
Georgian and Estonian conflicts."
Under severe pressure from the Russian government, which was
deeply embarrassed by some of the RBN's activities and subject to
pressure from other countries, the RBN officially closed its doors in
2008"-though many suspect that rather than "closing" they simply
moved offices to another location."' Still, it is encouraging to see that
some forms of international cybercrime cooperation are possible.
B. The Limits of Internationalism
Despite the success with using international pressure to disrupt
the RBN, severe procedural difficulties limit the effectiveness of
criminal law in addressing transnational cybercrime. Most American
procedural criminal law requirements are premised on the assumption
that the crimes to be investigated and prosecuted have occurred
within the geographic boundaries of the United States.82 In the rare
cases where cybercrimes are geographically limited in this way, these
procedural requirements are suitable. But the reality is that
cybercrime is predominantly (and almost exclusively) transnational in
character.
In many ways the situation is much like the challenge facing state
law enforcement officials prosecuting Depression-era bank robberies.
The perpetrators could escape investigation and prosecution simply
by changing jurisdictions and hiding behind differing laws. 3 The
problem is best exemplified by Clyde Barrow's famous fan letter to
77. See this story and others presented in the deeply detailed study of the
RBN in VERISIGN IDEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS TEAM, THE
RUSSIAN BUSINESS NETWORK: RISE AND FALL OF A CRIMINAL ISP 19
(2008).
78. Id. at 28.
79. John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2008, at Al.
80. VERISIGN IDEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS TEAM, supra note 77, at
32.
81. Warren, supra note 68.
82. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (holding
that the 4th Amendment envisioned protects only searches conducted on
U.S. soil).
83. See Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity and Public Goods: The Public/Priv-
ate 'Partnership', HOOVER INST., Sept. 2011, at 19.
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the Ford automobile company, thanking it for providing the means by
which he and Bonnie escaped justice.'
The solution, of course, was to federalize the crime of bank
robbery and, effectively, eliminate the boundary problem.5 But what
the U.S. government could do with the stroke of a Federal legislative
pen takes years and years of work in the international context. Today
we are just at the beginning of constructing a transnational set of
procedural rules for cybercrime. For the most part, information
sharing across national boundaries is slow and limited - far slower
and more limited than the nimbleness with which criminals can
change their tactics. Substantive convergence of the law is even
further in the future and may well prove impossible.
To date the only effort to develop a unitary procedural approach
to cybercrime is the Convention On Cybercrime developed by the
Council of Europe.' It aspires to create a single set of cyber laws and
procedures internationally in order to insure that there is no safe
harbor for cybercriminals. 7 But the process is slow; only thirty-eight
countries have ratified the Treaty in nine years." And significant
cultural and legal hurdles have further slowed convergence.8 Thus, in
the criminal domain the single most significant question is one of
extraterritoriality and engendering cooperation from international
partners.
The signatories to the Convention on Cybercrime (notably they
do not include Russia and China) have agreed to pass common laws
criminalizing cybercrime and to cooperate in the trans-border
investigation of cyber incidents." The trans-border efforts have,
however, been hampered by adherence to out-dated modes of
cooperation. Countries sharing cyber information must still proceed
through Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties" and Letters Rogatory,92
processes first developed in the 1800s.
84. Letter from Clyde Barrow to Henry Ford (Apr. 10, 1934) (on file with
Ford Motor Museum ID: 64.167.285.3).
85. Robbery & Burglury, 18 U.S.C § 2113 (2002).
86. Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185.
87. Id.
88. Status of Convention, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG
(last updated Jan. 21, 2013).
89. Jeremy Kirk, Despite Controversy, Cybercrime Treaty Endures, CIO
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://www.cio.com/article/694681/DespiteControve-
rsy-CybercrimeTreaty Endures.
90. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 86.
91. Amalie M. Weber, The Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 425, 442 (2003) (discussing the purpose of
MLATs).
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The growing consensus, therefore, is that the Convention on
Cybercrime does not work on at least two levels-operationally and
strategically." Operationally, the Convention's procedures are widely
regarded as ineffective, slow, and cumbersome.94 What is necessary, in
the first instance, is an effort through the Council of Europe to adopt
more rapid response mechanisms that work in real-time. The
technology for such an effort is readily available in the current inter-
connected environment.
Reopening the treaty for modifications of this sort is likely to be a
challenge, but one with a potentially significant long-term benefit. If
that course were deemed inexpedient, perhaps a better option would
be to act on a bilateral basis. Failing an effort to revise the
Convention, the United States can and should negotiate bilaterally to
achieve the same effect with a "coalition of the willing.""
Strategically, the absence of China and Russia from the
Convention makes it a bit of a paper tiger. If they refuse to bind
themselves to assist in the prosecution of cybercriminals they become,
in effect, a safe haven. The international community needs to move
beyond the current structure to a "naming and shaming" campaign
modeled on that developed to combat money laundering by the
Financial Action Task Force ("FATF").'
The FATF was created based on the recommendation of the G-7
back in 1989 and created a task force of experts in banking and law
enforcement to create a set of recommendations for best practices in
defending against illegal practices." The FATF has moved beyond
recommendations to a routine system of self-inspection. 8 More
importantly, the FATF uses the same standards to publicly identify
high-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions that do not implement
92. Letters Rogatory Defined, 22 C.F.R. § 92.54 (2006).
93. Weber, supra note 91.
94. See Paul Rosenzweig, Making Good Cybersecurity Law and Policy: How
Can We Get Tasty Sausage?, 8 J.L. & POL'Y FOR THE INFO. Soc'Y 389,
398 (2011).
95. Joseph Lester, Remarks by Leonard S. Spector, 99 AM. Soc'Y INT'L. L.
PR.OC. 251 (2005).
96. High Risk and Non-Cooperative Jurisdictions, FINAL ACTION TASK
FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperative-ju-
risdictions/more/aboutthenon-cooperativecountriesandterritoriesncct-
initiative.html (last updated Aug. 23, 2012).
97. Who We Are, FINAL ACTION TASK FORCE, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
pages/aboutus/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2013).
98. See ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR. PERMANENT COUNCIL,
DECISION No. 487: FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF) SELF
ASSESSMENTS ON TERRORIST FINANCING (2002).
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adequate safeguards." Creating a similar Cybercrime Action Task
Force ("CATF") should be a top priority for identifying and
combating countries that serve as havens for bad actors.
C. Data Sovereignty"
While cybercrime prevention is often a story of Western
cooperation and non-Western intransigence, even the West cannot
always find unity of purpose in its efforts. Indeed, the Westphalian
image is one of conflict, rather than cooperation. Already we can see
how it will play out in cyberspace. Consider first, the issue of data
sovereignty: In a wide, interconnected world, data and applications
run on servers. Those servers, though connected to a borderless web,
all reside somewhere physically. Who controls them and the data they
contain?
Today, these servers are situated based upon factors like weather
(cooler is better), existing infrastructure, and proximity to data
sources (to reduce time in transit). It may soon become more
commonplace, however, to situate your data storage centers and
servers based on legal concerns: "While the location of a data storage
center may be irrelevant to many operations and applications, the
physical location of a piece of data or information is often critical in
determining which sovereign nation controls that data. If information
is power, then the location of information may determine who
exercises power in cyberspace."10 The trend toward cloud systems -
and the lack of any consensus on the rules that govern the data stored
in them - is a paradigmatic example of the breakdown in
international governance.
One area in which this breakdown is manifest is in the
development of conflict around the issue of "data sovereignty," that
is, the question of which sovereign controls the data. Increasingly, the
cloud-structure of Internet service is allowing for distributed service
models at a distance. Data "owned" by an American company, say,
may be stored in Canada based on service provided by a French
entity. The question of sovereignty is really just a question of
jurisdiction and, therefore, of control and authority - but in a cyber-
world where the geographic boundaries are indistinct those questions
become quite ambiguous.
99. See FINAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 96.
100. The following section is derived from Michael Chertoff, Data Sovereignty
in the Cloud: The issues for Government, SAFEGOV.COM (Nov. 1, 2011),
http://safegov.org/2011/11/1/data-sovereignty-in-the-cloud-the-issues-
for-government, to which the author of this article contributed in the
drafting.
101. Id.
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In short, the question is: "Whose law is to be applied? The law of
the country where the customer created the data? The law of the
country (or several countries) where the server(s) are maintained? Or
the law of the home country where the data storage provider is
headquartered? Or all of the above?"o 2 The truth is that nobody
really knows.
In an ideal world, we could at least hope that the international
community would agree upon an international standard for the choice
of law rules - in effect agreeing on the bare minimum of deciding
what rules govern the question of how to decide which rules govern.
But prospects for such an agreement are highly unlikely. No
multinational organization (say, the United Nations) will undertake
that sort of effort and even if it did we might not like the result.
Instead, disputes over data sovereignty and jurisdiction will have
to be resolved one case at a time. The single factor that is likely to
determine the resolution of each dispute is almost certainly going to
be the physical location of the server. For example, when the United
States recently began seeking banking data from Swiss banks for tax
collection purposes, the critical factor was that economic
considerations required the Swiss banks to have a physical presence in
the United States. Without it they were not true international banks
- but with it they were manifestly subject to American jurisdiction
and control.10 3 By contrast, when data is housed outside the United
States it is much more likely that the other jurisdiction will be able to
impose its own legal requirements on the data - almost as if data
were subject to an in rem sort of action.
The bottom line however, is clear - there is a growing dispute
over precisely whose law will apply to legal conflicts on the Internet.
And in the end, in the absence of any systematic effort to construct a
legal system that fosters dispute resolution, these sorts of questions
are far more likely to be resolved by reference to the physical
infrastructure of the network than to any other frame of reference.
Where the servers are and where the data is stored will, in the end,
likely control whose law applies. As they say, "geography is
destiny."104
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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D. The Coming International Privacy War'05
There is another looming cloud on the Internet governance
horizon that ought to be highlighted, a coming conflict between the
privacy values of the United States and those of the European Union
("EU"). This conflict is best seen in a challenge to cloud-based data
aggregation services - services that are generally accepted in the
United States, but not in the EU.
Recently EU Justice Commissioner Vivian Redding stated, "[We]
believe that companies who direct their services to European
consumers should be subject to EU data protection laws. Otherwise,
they should not be able to do business on our internal market.""6 In
this vein the EU plans to back up new data privacy requirements
with rules that fine businesses five percent of their global turnover if
they breach the requirements. 07 Even more recently the Commission
Nationale de L'informatique et des Libetes ("CNIL"), which is the
data privacy authority of France, issued a report on behalf of all EU
data protection authorities, critiquing Google, by name, for their
inadequate privacy protections. According to the CNIL, Google's
platform allowed the "uncontrolled combination of data across
services" in violation of EU law.' The CNIL, as well, threatened to
sue Google if it did not change its policy.
This is challenge, in the guise of privacy regulation, is really the
same challenge just noted with regard to the question of data
sovereignty - whose law applies? Where, earlier, we imagined disputes
regarding data retention and commercial conflicts, now we can see
that the same issues will bedevil more fundamental questions about
the legality of existing Internet business models and the application of
divergent domestic laws on privacy. These conflicting legal
requirements will deter product development, and create legal
ambiguity. If you want a particularly stark example of how this
105. This section is derived from Michael Chertoff, Cloud Computing and the
Looming Global Privacy Battle, WASH. PosT (Feb. 9, 2012), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cloud-computing-sets-stage-for-a-glo-
bal-privacy-battle/2012/02/06/glQAhV2V2Q story.html, to which the
author of this article contributed in the drafting.
106. Kevin J. O'Brien, E. U. to Tighten Web Privacy Law, Risking Trans-
Atlantic Dispute, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 10, 2011, at B4.
107. Ravi Mandall, New EU Date protection Laws May Impose Big Fines,
ITPROPORTAL.COM (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.itproportal.com/2011/
12/07/new-eu-data-protection-laws-may-impose-big-fines/.
108. See Google's New Privacy Policy: Incomplete Information and
Uncontrolled Combination of Data Across Services, COMMISSION
NATIONALE DE L'INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTIts (Oct. 16, 2012),
http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/googles-new-
privacy-policy-incomplete-information-and-uncontrolled-combination-of-
data-across-ser/.
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conflict might play out, consider that in September 2012 police in
Brazil briefly detained the head of Google's local operations because
the company had refused an order to take down a YouTube video.
The video was about a paternity suit involving a local mayoral
candidate." In the end, Google complied - not in this case because of
where the data was, but one suspects because of where their own
manager was physically located - in a Brazilian jail.
We can only expect this problem to be exacerbated as time goes
by. If choice of law rules for commercial disputes are beyond our
expectations for the UN (or any other multinational body) how much
more unlikely is it that rules regarding the regulation of content of
the web can be developed for universal application. While the US-EU
dispute is emblematic of the possibility for divergent viewpoints,
lurking behind it are even more significant disputes. In the end,
China's Great Firewall and Iran's plan to build a "halal" network are
really efforts by sovereigns to control the substance of information on
the network. Though the types of control they seek to exercise and
the reasons they do so are be more problematic than the European
privacy efforts they all, in the end, share the same typology -
sovereign nations seeking to regulate content. In the absence of an
international r6gime we would hope that the Western nations would
agree on a joint position in opposition to content control.
Unfortunately, it appears more likely that a "privacy war" will
develop as the United States and the EU contest to impose their will.
This is the worst possible result, pitting natural allies against each
other.110
E. An International Strategy
Given the limitations of a Westphalian-based policy, it is not
surprising that the Obama Administration has pursued a multilateral
approach to international cyber issues. The recently released
International Strategy for Cyberspace points toward the creation of an
"open, interoperable, secure, and reliable" communications and
information architecture (surely a positive goal) through building and
sustaining "norms of international behavior."' The strategy goes
further in articulating the norms it seeks to foster (freedom, privacy,
respect for property, protection from crime, and the right of self-
defense)"l2 but one may be forgiven in thinking that these norms are
109. The World is What You Make It, THE ECONOMIsT, Oct 27, 2012, at 21.
110. Chertoff, supra note 105.
111. THE WHITEHOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR, CYBERSPACE:
PROSPERITY, SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss viewer/
international strategy-forcyberspace.pdf.
112. See generally id at 10.
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articulated at too high a level of generality; and unlikely to find great
acceptance in many nations that value neither privacy nor freedom.
The limits of this sort of strategy are best exemplified by how the
strategy addresses the problem of cybercrime. We have seen, earlier,
how limited the effectiveness of the Cybercrime Convention has
been."' And yet the principal goal of the new strategy for addressing
cybercrime is to "harmonize criminal law" internationally by
"expanding accession" to the Convention."4 If there were a realistic
prospect that criminal havens, like Russia and China, would both join
the convention and also implement it aggressively, this policy would
likely be effective. But in the absence of that prospect, the promise of
a multilateral policy seems a bit empty.
F. Cyber Warfare Convention
Or consider how the multilateral impulse has begun to drive
negotiations over a cyber-warfare convention. For years, the United
States resisted Russian blandishments to begin negotiations over a
cyber-warfare convention, akin to the chemical warfare convention."'
The Russian model would outlaw certain types of cyber-attacks (say
on civilian targets, like electric grids) as out of bounds."6 At its core,
this seems a reasonable objective.
The principal American objection has been that a cyber-treaty,
unlike a ballistic missile treaty, is inherently unverifiable."' In other
words, in a world where weapons cannot be identified and counted
and where attribution is difficult, if not impossible, how could any
country be assured that others were abiding by the terms of the
agreement?
Beyond verifiability, there is a question of enforceability. Those
who are skeptics of a cyber-warfare convention point, for example, to
the provisions of the 1899 Hague Convention, which prohibited the
bombardment of civilian targets."' Needless to say, the commitment
to withhold bombing of civilian targets did not survive the World
War II Blitz of London and the firebombing of Dresden (not to
113. See, e.g., Kirk, supra note 89 (providing that many European countries
are fearful that the Convention violates international law and state
sovereignty and thus only thirty-nations have ratified its provisions).
114. THE WHITEHOUSE, supra note 111.
115. Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View, in FUTURE
CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW (Peter Berkowitz ed.
2011).
116. Id. at 4-5.
117. Id. at 10.
118. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 3 & 25, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
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mention the nuclear targeting of Hiroshima and Nagasaki)."' There
is, it is argued, therefore good reason to doubt that a prohibition on
targeting electric grids (for example), would be sustainable in a truly
significant conflict.'20 Notwithstanding these concerns, in 2009, the
United States abandoned its position and agreed to discussions with
Russia. 121
As Jack Goldsmith of Harvard points out, in addition to the
inherent inability to verify or enforce any cyber-disarmament treaty,
the treaty would greatly limit America's freedom to act offensively in
support of its own sovereign interests.122 We would be bound to
restrain the National Security Agency's operations in a host of ways
to abide by the treaty's requirements. In addition, we would have to
clean up our own house. In a 2010 survey by McAfee, the computer
security company, more information-technology experts around the
world expressed concern about the United States as a source of
computer network attacks than about any other country. 23 And so we
would likely be obliged to take steps to monitor the domestic Internet
(and reign in our own hacker community) in compliance with our
treaty obligations that would be a civil libertarian nightmare.
More significantly, the proposed treaty comes with some baggage.
Non-Western states view the cyber domain less as a means of
communication and more as a means of control - a viewpoint they
want to import into any global treaty.124 Consider the International
Information Security agreement among the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization ("SCO") nations (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).'" Under the agreement state
security and state control over information technologies and threats
119. Nazi Germany Bombs London in First Day of the Blitz, N.Y. TIMES
(Sep. 7, 1940), http://earning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/sept-7-
1940-nazi-germany-bombs-Iondon-in-first-day-of-the-blitz/. Conrad C.
Crane, Dresden: Air Attack On, PBS (Feb. 13, 1949), http://www.pbs
.org/thewar/detail_5229.htm.
120. Stewart Baker, Denial of Service, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial-of-service?p
age=full.
121. John Markoff & Andrew E. Kramer, In Shift, U.S. Talks to Russia on
Internet Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at Al.
122. Goldsmith, supra note 115.
123. STEWART BAKER., SHAUN WATERMAN, & GEORGE IVANOV, IN THE
CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 30
(2010).
124. James Glanz & John Markoff, U.S. Underwrites Internet Detour Around
Censors, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2011, at Al.
125. SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORG., http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/ (last
visited Jan. 1, 2013).
426
22
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 37 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol37/iss2/10
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL - VOLUME 37 - ISSUE 2 - 2012
The International Governance Framework for Cybersecurity
are permitted. 126 In the view of the SCO nations the major threats to
their own sovereignty are the "dominant position in the information
space" of Western nations and the "dissemination of information
harmful to the socio-political systems, spiritual, moral, and cultural
environment of the States."'27
G. Internet Freedom
And that leads to another consideration America's interest in
Internet freedom. We are often conflicted in that view, since freedom
to use the Internet for political purposes often comes at the cost of
decreased security on the network. But by and large we have come to
see freedom of expression on the Internet as a fundamental "good."
That is why Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized that
"[t]hose who disrupt the free flow of information in our society or any
other pose a threat to our economy, our government, and our civil
society.""'
As a symbol of our view that freedom of expression is critical, the
United States is leading efforts to develop the technology for a
"shadow" Internet, one that can be deployed independent of the main
backbone of the network.'2 1 If successful this new technology would, in
effect, create an "Internet in a suitcase" and would enable dissidents
to avoid the censorship of repressive authoritarian countries. To quote
Secretary Clinton again, from an email correspondence with
journalists James Glanz and John Markoff:
We see more and more people around the globe using the
Internet, mobile phones and other technologies to make their voices
heard as they protest against injustice and seek to realize their
aspirations. . . . There is a historic opportunity to effect positive
change, change America supports. . . . So we're focused on helping
them do that, on helping them talk to each other, to their
communities, to their governments and to the world.2 0
In short, one aspect of the new multilateral policy calls for the
development of norms that are squarely at odds with those espoused
126. Goldsmith, supra note 115, at 4.
127. See Tom Gjelten, Seeing the Internet as an 'Information Weapon',
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 23, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/te-
mplates/story/story.php?storyld=130052701 (providing background
about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's definition of cyberwar
and its perspective on Western nations in the control of the Internet).
128. Hillary Clinton, Sec'y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21,
2010), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/13551
9.html.
129. Glanz & Markoff, supra note 124.
130. Id.
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by repressive governments. In that context, finding an international
consensus is likely to prove very difficult.
H. The International Telecommunications Union
So, if the Westphalian model leads to conflict and if the
multilateral model involves disagreements that cannot be squared,
why not go whole hog and create an international institution to run
the Internet? Alas, that option, too, is problematic.
For years the architecture of the Internet has been defined by two
NGO organizations, IETF and ICANN. Both are non-partisan and
professional and their policy-making is highly influenced by nations
that are technologically reliant on the Internet and have contributed
the most to its development and growth.'"' As a consequence,
America has an influential role in those organizations.
Many in the world see this as problematic. The International
Telecommunications Union ("ITU") (which dates back to 1865, but is
now a part of the United Nations3 2) has been proposed as a better
model for Internet governance.' Transferring authority to the ITU
(or a similar organization) is seen as a means of opening up the
control of the Internet into a more conventional international process
that dismantles what some see as the current position of global
dominance of U.S. national interests.134 In the ITU, like most U.N.
institutions, a "one nation/one vote" rule applies-a prospect that
would certainly diminish Western influence on Internet governance."'
Some argue that giving the ITU a role in Internet governance is
no different from the role that the World Customs Organization has
in setting shipping standards, or the International Civil Aviation
Organization has in setting aviation traffic rules.'36 To- some degree
that may be true. On the other hand, aviation communications
frequency requirements and standard shipping container sizes are not
131. Will Oremus, Will the Internet Always be Run by Unelected Technocr-
ats?, SLATE (Jun. 20, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future-tense/
2012/06/20/internet-governanceus__house resolutiontells un to b
utt out.html.
132. INT'L TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, http://www.itu.int/en/history/ove-
rview/Pages/history.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).
133. Emma Llans6, ITU: Internet Governance or Just Governing the
Internet?, CDT (Jun. 28, 2012), https://www.cdt.org/blogs/emma-
Ilanso/2806itu-internet-governance-or-j ust-governing-internet.
134. Geoff Huston, Opinion: ICANN, the ITU, WSIS, and Internet Gover-
nance, 8 INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 1 (2005).
135. Collection of the Basic Texts of the ITU Adopted by the Plenipotentiary
Conference, Chap. III INT'L TELECOMMUNICATION UNION Art. 32A, 117,
http://www.itu.int/pub/S-CONF-PLEN-2011/en (2011).
136. JOVAN KURBALIJA & EDUARDO GELBSTEIN, ISSUES, ACTORS, AND DIVIDES
17 (Jovan Kurbalija & Eduardo Gelbstein eds. 2005).
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fraught with political significance in the same way that the Internet
has become. Rather those institutions succeed precisely because they
manage the mundane, technical aspects of a highly specialized
industry. They would be ill-suited to provide broadly applicable
content regulation for a world-girding communications system. Thus,
some fear that a transition to the ITU would run the risk of
politicizing an already contentious domain even further.'
At bottom, however, the preference for ICANN over the ITU is
not just about national interests. It is also, more fundamentally,
about the contrast between ICANN's general adherence to a
deregulated market-driven approach' and the turgid, ineffective
process of the international public regulatory sector.139 The American
policy making apparatus is slow enough. The problem will, if
anything, be exacerbated in the international sphere. Given the scale
of the problem it is likely that the mechanisms for multinational
cooperation are too cumbersome, hierarchical and slow to be of much
use in the development of international standards. Acceptable
behavior on the Internet mutales across multiple dimensions at a pace
that far outstrips the speed of the policy-making apparatus within the
U.S. government already - and the international system is
immeasurably slower. Some are justifiably concerned that there is no
surer way to kill the economic value of the Internet than to let the
United Nations run it.1
40
Although there is a real intellectual appeal to the idea of an
international governance system to manage an international entity
like the Internet, the prognosis of a cybered Westphalian age is
almost certainly the more realistic. We are likely to see the United
States make common cause with trustworthy allies and friends around
the globe to establish cooperative mechanisms that yield strong
standards of conduct while forgoing engagement with multilateral
organizations and authoritarian sovereigns.
III. BILATERAL COOPERATION - THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA
The last topic for discussion is, in a narrow sense, a reiteration of
our brief discussion of a FATF model for cybercrime. The most
137. Id. at 20.
138. Huston, supra note 134.
139. Id.
140. See Daniel Thomas, Richard Waters & James Fontanella-Khan, The
Internet: Command and Control, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/fab58818-e63a-11el-
ac5fOOl44feab49a.html#axzz2BHyRdsNE.
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promising way forward, it seems, is for like-minded countries to
cooperate as far as they can on common goals.
Canada and the United States have begun by recognizing that
their intertwined economies necessarily mean an intertwined cyber
domain."' As President Obama and Prime Minister Harper put it in
their "Beyond the Border" declaration, the two countries are
committed to "working together to prevent, respond to and recover
from physical and cyber disruptions of critical infrastructure."l 42 In
doing that they will seek to work cooperatively "to strengthen the
resilience of our critical and cyber infrastructure with strong cross-
border engagement."4 3 Both countries recognize that they benefit
from their integrated infrastructures, but that they also share
common vulnerabilities as evidenced by the statement, "Our countries
intend to strengthen cybersecurity to protect vital government and
critical digital infrastructure of national importance, and to make
cyberspace safer for all our citizens."'
Given the intertwined nature of Canadian and American
economic interests, this resolve to begin work on joint cybersecurity
infrastructure protection efforts is welcome. Consider, as just one
example, the massive interdependence of American and Canadian
electric networks.' It does little good, say, for America to harden its
electric generation infrastructure against a Stuxnet-like attack,'46 if a
vulnerability in Ontario has catastrophic cross-border consequences.
Likewise, Canadian protection of, say, the St. Lawrence Seaway, is of
little value if America does not follow on. A joint approach to joint
assets is both wise and essential.
With that perspective, the implementation of the Beyond the
Border agreement is something of a disappointment. While the plan
recognizes the critical importance of the cyber domain, 47 it is fair to
141. See AFP, U.S., Canada Launch Joint Cybersecurity Plan, SEC'Y WEEK
(Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.securityweek.com/us-canada-launch-joint-
cybersecurity-plan.
142. THE WHITEHOUSE, BEYOND THE BORDER: A SHARED VISION FOR
PERIMETER SECURITY AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS (2011)
[hereinafter BEYOND THE BORDER], available at http://www.Whitehouse
.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/04/declaration-president-obama-and-
prime-minister-harper-canada-beyond-bord
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Joseph A. McKinney, U.S.-Can. Energy Interdependencies, 2 S. J. CAN.
STUD. 1, 2 (2008) (discussing the economic forces and policy decisions
that create interdependence between the U.S. and Can.).
146. Robert McMillan, New Spy Rootkit Targets Industrial Secrets, TECHW-
ORLD (Jul. 19, 2010, 9:59 PM), http://news.techworld.com/security/32
32365/new-spy-rootkit-targets-industrial-secrets/.
147. BEYOND THE BORDER., supra note 143, at iv.
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say that most of the effort at this juncture is simply involved in
defining the problem more that identifying joint solutions. Thus the
Beyond the Border Action Plan" lists the following cyber-related
tasks:
Protect vital government and critical digital infrastructure of
binational importance, and make cyberspace safer for all our
citizens.
Expand joint leadership on international cybersecurity efforts.'49
While surely laudable goals they are rather modest in nature. For
example, the way that the action plan says it will measure its success
in protecting infrastructure is not, actually by attempting to
determine if the infrastructure is actually better protected. Instead
the plan says: "Measuring Progress: [Department of State] DOS,
[Department of Homeland Security] DHS, and Public Safety Canada
will report on joint or coordinated engagements with the private
sector and external stakeholders, including joint briefings and
presentations, assistance provided during the course of a cyber-
incident, and joint communications products that are developed.""'0
While engagement with the private sector is a means to the end, it is
not, sadly, the end itself.
Likewise, in support of joint leadership in the international
sphere, Canada promises to accede to the Cybercrime Convention;''
the plan goes on to provide: "Measuring Progress: DOS and Public
Safety Canada will report on the effectiveness of sharing cyber
security best practices, the number of engagements with third
countries, and how these efforts have translated into advancing
American-Canadian objectives on cyber issues in international
forums."'5 2 Again, good ideas but they will only get you so far.
To some degree the uncertainty of these goals is understandable.
A fair reading of Canada's Cybersecurity Strategy,' suggests that, at
this juncture, Canada has not done as much work as the United
States in developing the domestic government infrastructure for
operationalizing cybersecurity; the policies that will guide the use of
those assets or the legal authorities that will permit effective action In
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 23.
151. Id. at 24
152. Id. at 24.
153. Gov'T OF CAN., CANADA'S CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: FOR A
STRONGER. AND MORE PROSPEROUS CANADA (2010), available at http://
www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/cybr-scrty/ fl/ccss-scc-eng.pdf.
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fact, Parliament is considering a bill to amend the Canadian criminal
code to authorize greater government access to private internet
communications in support of cybersecurity efforts.'54 Similar bills
introduced in 2009 and 2010 failed to win the necessary approval.' 5
All of this is not, of course, to diminish Canada's effort, but
simply to note that the scope of a coordinated response is, necessarily,
limited by the existing capabilities of the two parties. The highest
value of U.S.-Canadian cybersecurity cooperation is, at this juncture,
probably American willingness to share best practices and other
operational capacities. More saliently, in the end, the likely best of all
possible worlds is for a joint services model of cybersecurity to be
developed. Given the cyber threat to literally every sort of critical
infrastructure and the inextricable nature of the U.S.-Canadian
relationship, it seems to me that no other structure would be
effective. When financial systems, electric grids, and air traffic
controls are all, to some degree, shared, only a robust coordinated
joint defense has any prospect of success.
154. See, e.g., Protecting Children from Internet Predators Act, C-30, 41st
Parliament (Can. 1st Sess. 2012).
155. See, e.g., An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Interception of Private
Communications and Related Warrants and Orders), C-50, 40th
Parliament (Can. 3rd Sess. 2010).
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